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Abstract: 
The concept of causality has been investigated for millennia. Different approaches in 
assessing causality, such as determining purpose or determining sensible proof, make it difficult to 
compare the major theories and to rank them as best or most credible. This paper addresses the 
theories of Aristotle, Hume, and Mill before offering Anscombe’s theory of causation as the most 
effective one for those who believe a theory of causation should show some purpose. Anscombe’s 
theory tracks well with Aristotle’s teleological structure of causes, and her views on intention play a 
role in emphasizing motivation and purpose. 
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The concept of causality has been pondered and disputed for millennia; thus, it is difficult 
to settle on any one view as the best. However, to adapt an idea from Aristotle, we can examine the 
final need for a theory of causality to evaluate more easily those different theories. This paper will 
address the issue of finding the best theory of causality by first briefly explaining the theories of 
Aristotle, David Hume, and John Stuart Mill before offering a more extensive description and 
evaluation of G.E.M. (Elizabeth) Anscombe’s work on causality and intentionality. Finally, this 
paper will argue that Anscombe’s theory can be considered the best for those who search for a more 
human element and interaction in cause and effect than other theories permit. 
The first source to consider in established theories of causes is Aristotle, who argues that to 
know truth, the vocation of the philosopher, one must understand causes (Aristotle 1946, 11). He 
goes on to describe the four causes (12), and although Aristotle’s causes are likely familiar to anyone 
who has completed an introductory philosophy course, I will describe them here in order to more 
clearly emphasize the differences between Aristotle’s theory and those of Hume and Mill. The first 
cause is material, described as the most basic matter that makes up something, and one example is 
the bronze that makes up a statue. The second cause is formal, explained as the form or pattern, and 
he offers the example of the ratio 2:1 and number as formal causes of the musical octave. The third 
cause is efficient, denoting the agent by which change begins or ends, and the examples here are fairly 
general, e.g., the maker is the cause of that which is made. The fourth cause is the final cause, and 
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final here means the end purpose. For what reason does a thing exist or have been initiated? Aristotle 
says by way of illustration that health is the reason and purpose for walking. The third and fourth 
forms, and the first two to a lesser degree, highlight the importance of human agency in causation as 
a human must make a decision and then initiate action or change, and this point will be revisited 
below when Anscombe’s theory is addressed. 
In his Physics, where he also explains the four causes with the same examples, Aristotle 
pursues the line of thought further. He claims that the natural philosopher should know all four 
causes and be prepared to answer “how” and “why” about each one, thus gaining a deeper 
understanding (Aristotle 1970, 165). He notes that the material and the final causes often coincide 
because the purpose of a thing is so rarely separated from its make up. Such a relationship can be 
illustrated by borrowing an example from the Physics (165).  In going to war, the material cause 
would include the mustered troops, and the final cause might be to gain an empire. The troops make 
up the force whose purpose is to conquer others (or to defend a state, but that reason does not appear 
in this section). It is the human agency, powered by the human motivation, that defines the cohesion 
of the clauses. 
By contrast, many later thinkers do not address human agency in the same way that Aristotle 
does. For example, David Hume addresses causation in the eighteenth century, and his explanations 
rarely, if ever, touch on motivation. Those explanations concern themselves primarily with proving 
causation when correlation might have been a more accurate description. Hume states that there is 
no internal quality in any object that can convincingly explain why that object and another object 
appear in some relationship or never appear together (Hume 1964, 376) as if one elicited or 
prohibited the appearance of the other. Hume questions the assumption that everything in existence 
must have a cause and asserts, “Accordingly we shall find upon examination, that every 
demonstration, which has been produc’d for the necessity of a cause, is fallacious and sophistical.” 
(Hume 1964, 381) He then addresses three arguments for cause and finds them all wanting (Hume 
1964, 381-83). The first argument relies on the equality of time and place and contends that unless 
there is a cause fixed in one time and place, the effect in a subsequent one is left unmoored, unable 
to exist. The second argument suggests that if a thing in existence has no cause, then it must be its 
own cause. Hume dismisses this argument as relying on the premise that all things in existence must 
have a cause, so its reasoning is circular. The third argument is similar to the first: anything that is 
not produced by a cause is produced by nothing; therefore, nothing is its cause. The argument 
continues that because this is impossible, it actually demonstrates that something must have been the 
cause. Hume refutes this argument, beginning with this dismissive introduction, “I believe it will 
not be necessary to employ many words in showing the weakness of this argument, after what I have 
said of the foregoing.” (Hume 1964, 383) Hume, essentially, uses the same refutation that he did 
with the second argument. He claims that the third argument also presupposes a cause-effect 
relationship, but such a relationship cannot be intuitively or demonstrably proven. 
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Hume next addresses the impressions of memory or senses and the idea of the resulting 
existence of that “which produces the object of impression or is produc’d by it” (Hume 1964, 385). 
As he works through the role of impressions through either memory or the senses, he resists labeling 
any consistent conjunction between actions or objects as cause and effect because there is still no 
way to prove that one caused the other (Hume 1964, 389). By way of a modern illustration, when 
runners train for an event, they take into consideration the efficacy of previous preparations. They 
research what other runners eat before the event and how those runners train in the months leading 
up to the event in order to have a successful result. They look at their own experiences to see how 
they felt after eating particular foods at particular times and even wearing particular gear for 
particular weather. Perhaps resting the day before an event makes most runners feel stronger during 
the event, or perhaps taking nutrition every five miles helps alleviate cramping. Runners would take 
the rest and the nutrition as causes of the stronger, cramp-free results. Even though this example 
focuses on preparations that most people agree matter – unlike, say, wearing the same pair of socks 
for every race that one wore years ago in winning a race – Hume would be skeptical and insist on 
finding a necessary connection. Hume’s approach certainly differs from that of Aristotle, who 
valorizes the final cause and, likely, would label those preparations as causes to serve the final one of 
having a successful race. 
John Stuart Mill takes a similar tack in questioning the certainty of causation in his A System 
of Logic, taking issue with the generally accepted assumption that events have causes, even though 
such relationships cannot be identified beyond doubt. Mill’s protest is worth quoting here: “To say 
that belief suffices for its own justification is making opinion the test of opinion; it is denying the 
existence of any outward standard, the conformity of an opinion to which constitutes its truth.” 
(Mill 2009, 399) In pursuing this line of thought, Mill remarks that the Ancient Greeks, including 
Aristotle, understood the related concepts of “Chance and Spontaneity” (Mill 2009, 400), so that 
the physical laws cannot always assure that certain events will consistently bring about other certain 
events or be consistently produced by still other, earlier events. Mill speaks of the unconditional 
relationships between apparent causes and effects to include necessary stimuli that are not observed. 
In the example of the runners above, Mill’s theory would account for other factors not readily seen 
as connections: amount of sleep or airborne allergens and so on. Interestingly, for the purposes of 
this paper, in critiquing cause and effect, and, in the process, inductive reasoning, Mill practices 
causation as defined by Aristotle when he says, “[I]f, therefore, we can substitute for the more fallible 
forms of the process, an operation grounded on the same process in a less fallible form, we shall have 
effected a very material improvement” (Mill 2009, 401). By investigating the problems with 
causation based on, and limited by, sensory observation and experience, Mill invokes Aristotle’s final 
cause when he explains how and why he will perform act A: to bring about result B. It is just this turn 
which best illustrates the difference between, on the one hand, Hume’s and Mill’s theories of 
causation and, on the other, those of Aristotle and, as described below, Anscombe. 
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 Anscombe’s landmark essay “Modern Moral Philosophy” serves as a critique of modern 
moral philosophy because that philosophy lacks an adequate approach to psychology, because the 
moral sense of “ought” regarding moral obligation no longer fits, and because there are no 
discernible differences among English moral philosophers since Henry Sidgwick (Anscombe 1958, 
1). Although her argument is a wide-ranging one, the second point above is germane to this paper. 
The moral sense of “ought” illustrates a theory of causation that hearkens back to Aristotle’s, even 
as Anscombe claims that Aristotle is little help in clarifying the current modern English moralists 
because they all neglect to factor in the quality of immorality as defined by Hebrew-Christian ethic 
(Anscombe 1958, 10), thereby losing an integral anchor, one that Aristotle cannot explicitly provide. 
Anscombe evaluates the arguments of consequentialists who define morality as that which would 
lead to positive consequences, and the criteria for what is positive is that which their contemporary 
society has deemed so. Thus, the consequentialists learn the standard of morality through 
observation and experience, and they view causation as the move from one action that can produce 
positive consequences, even if those positive consequences are positive only to the individual or in 
some underground society. In my own work, I research studies on academic plagiarism, including 
studies concerned with why students plagiarize. Students often admit to feeling desperation in 
completing a difficult writing assignment, or they invoke the standard complaint of a crushing 
workload at particular points in the academic term. The students who plagiarize under those 
conditions see the consequence of having completed an assignment and earning course credit toward 
a degree as sufficient motivation to dismiss their moral sense of doing honest work. Pressure becomes 
the cause of the dishonest act of cheating.  
 Anscombe continues her investigation of causation by offering an example of exchanging 
money for goods (Anscombe 1958, 3-4). In critiquing Hume’s philosophy, she begins by suggesting 
that truth is made up of either relations of ideas or of matters of fact. Relations of ideas can be 
illustrated with currency exchange rates, and her example is that 20s=£1. Her example of matters of 
fact describes a service rendered: A orders potatoes, and B supplies them and sends a bill. But 
Anscombe then points out that truth, as those two descriptions limit it, does not include the owing 
of money for the potatoes. She says that the owing is “brute relative to” the above descriptions, which 
also spawn other brute relations, such as the potatoes were delivered in a certain manner and the 
buyer has the money to pay for them. For the delivery of potatoes to be considered a cause of paying 
the money depends on the concept of owing and, further, on the idea of ought. While Hume’s and 
Mill’s theories of causation neglect this moral aspect in favor of a more physical, natural approach, 
Anscombe sees the need to factor in this human agency. We can surmise, then, that if A wants 
groceries delivered and wants to avoid the censure of the local merchants, A will pay B the socially 
agreed upon price for the produce. Such would be morality rooted in social norms but connected 
on a deeper level with an absolute sense of morality, which is what Anscombe wants to feature. Her 
view is similar to Aristotle’s because it does focus on the importance of the final cause, although 
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Aristotle did not base his causation on moral reasons. Such a base is made possible, according to 
Anscombe, through the influence of Christianity (Anscombe 1958, 5). 
Anscombe’s theory of causation can be seen, to some extent, in her book Intention. In 
differentiating between acts that are intentional and those that are not, Anscombe says that we can 
ask why such an action was initiated, and the response should, by design, reveal the reason for acting 
(Anscombe 1963, 9). Such a question, once again, leads back to Aristotle’s final cause as the 
motivation for actions, once more highlighting the human agency and reasoning. In fact, in her 
careful examination of the various shades of meaning of the word intention, Anscombe offers 
examples of cause and effect that do not reflect completely human interaction – such as predicting 
an eclipse based on evidence – but she dismisses that kind of intention for more interesting work: 
“[A]n answer to the question ‘Why?’ which does not give reason for thinking the thing true does 
not, therefore, give a reason for acting. It may mention a cause, and this is far from what we want 
[emphasis in the original]” (Anscombe 1963, 15). She continues with deeper analysis of causation 
that requires human agency, even when there is some misunderstanding. In this regard, Anscombe 
describes mental causes, and these can trigger actions, but also feelings and thoughts (Anscombe 
1963, 16). Her example of the former is that certain music can excite a person and cause that person 
to walk about. Her example of the latter is more detailed. A child sees something red just barely in 
sight and is afraid because he is told it is a bit of Satan. He quite likely misheard the word satin, but 
his mishearing and his knowledge of Satan combine into a mental cause, the source of the 
consequent fear. Immediately after the example, Anscombe recognizes that her theory of causation 
differs from Hume’s, so much so that it might not be considered as an example of causality. 
However, Anscombe has a different end in mind, so her theory of causality will branch down a 
different path than did Hume’s. 
Moreover, Anscombe distinguishes between motives and intentions, and this distinction is 
important to her theory of causality (Anscombe 1963, 18-19). She says, “A man’s intention is what 
he aims at or chooses; his motive is what determines the aim or choice; and I suppose that 
‘determines’ is another work for ‘causes.’ [emphasis in the original].” (Anscombe 1963, 19) In 
looking again at the idea of plagiarism as described above, it is the combined pressures of time and 
responsibility that cause, or motivate, some students to plagiarize in order to meet their deadline 
obligations and academic obligations. Students in this scenario would engage in what most or all 
universities consider an unethical act in order to avoid negative consequences to their academic 
record. What determines the aim or choice, of course, answers the question why. This idea of 
causality reflects Aristotle’s in reaching the final cause because of highest import in determining 
cause is finding the reason for a stimulus.  
Deciding which theory of causation is the best is a difficult task because the purpose of 
determining the best theory defines the criteria. One might dismiss such a claim as begging the 
question: This paper whose purpose is to show which theory of causation is best has determined that 
a theory which shows purpose is best. However, such a reason resonates with Aristotle’s teleological 
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theory of causation because it requires one to ask why, pointing to the final cause. Aristotle’s theory 
also involves human choice and activity, and Anscombe’s theory extends his by working through the 
intricacies of motive and intention before pointing to the final purpose – the why – as the primary 
aspect of a theory of causation. There being no objective standard for assessing which theory is best, 
we can only return, then, to the claim made in the opening paragraph: Anscombe’s theory can be 
considered the best for those who search for a more human element and interaction in cause and 
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